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
9 January 1959

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

9 January 1959

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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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Geneva talks: [Mikoyan, speaking with Secretary Dulles on 5 January, questioned the desire of the United States to reach agreement on nuclear test cessation and warned that such agreement would be impossible if the United States continued to insist on majority voting in the proposed control commission.] The nuclear test talks reconvened in Geneva on 5 January with a gloomy forecast by the Soviet delegate in view of the West's refusal to accept Soviet demands for a permanent and unconditional agreement. Soviet propaganda has charged that the introduction by the US of new information on the difficulties of detecting underground nuclear explosions is a further move to prevent agreement.

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Middle East drought: [For the second consecutive year, severe drought and locusts seriously threaten food crops in Jordan and Israel. Both governments have requested the US to supply foodstuffs in the very near future. Yemen is also undergoing food shortages as the result of drought.]

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Morocco: [The situation in the principal areas of Berber tribal dissidence apparently continues unresolved despite government claims that the tribesmen are responding to King Mohamed V's 48-hour ultimatum of 5 January ordering them to submit to central authority. Berber tribes in the High Atlas region south and east of the southern Moroccan city of Marrakech now are also reportedly becoming increasingly restive.]

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Belgian Congo: Belgian security forces have re-established order, and Leopoldville is outwardly calm after three days of rioting. Some Congolese leaders have been arrested. Accra, Cairo, and Moscow view the riots as springing out of African desire for independence, while the Belgian press primarily blames economic conditions for the rioting.

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Philippines: Ambassador Bohlen notes an increasing trend in Philippine official thinking toward a re-orientation of foreign policy away from the US and closer to the islands' Asian neighbors. This nationalistic feeling has been evidenced by a hardening Philippine attitude in base talks with the US.

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III. THE WEST

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*France: [New Premier Michel Debré, an ardent Gaullist, is critical of US policies which he regards as frustrating France's claims to great-power status] The new cabinet, composed mostly of holdovers, including the minister of foreign affairs, is expected to follow very closely the policy and administrative framework De Gaulle has outlined in recent decrees.

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Cuba: [In the formative stage of the Castro-Urrutia government, there are signs of feeling against the United States Government. However,] major government policies are being held in abeyance pending decisions by Castro, who only arrived in Havana on 8 January.

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR--Geneva Talks

With resumption on 5 January of negotiations at Geneva for an agreement on cessation of nuclear tests, Moscow reverted to its insistence on a Western commitment to a permanent unconditional agreement before further discussion of the details of the proposed control system. On 6 January, the Soviet delegate to the talks took issue with four specific Western positions: insisting upon majority rule in the commission; linking extension of a one-year test suspension with progress in other areas of disarmament; giving any party the right to denounce the agreement when violated by another; and international staffing of control posts to minimize use of nationals of the host state. At the 7 January session he insisted on postponing discussion of any other issues until the question of duration of the treaty is resolved.

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[Speaking with Secretary Dulles on 5 January, Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan questioned the desire of the United States to reach agreement on nuclear test cessation and warned that such agreement would be impossible if the United States continued to insist on majority voting in the proposed control commission. At a private dinner on the same day, Mikoyan stated that the USSR would not give up the veto on such a commission, since decisions would be meaningless if they were not unanimous.]

Moscow has charged that the new technical information introduced by the United States delegate on 5 January with regard to the difficulties of detecting underground explosions was a further Western effort to prevent agreement. Soviet delegate Tsarapkin rejected a Western request for a three-power study of this problem, maintaining that the establishment of such a study would undermine the entire basis on which the conference was organized, i. e., the conclusions and recommendations of the Geneva conference of experts.

Moscow's renewed emphasis in the negotiations on its objections to the Western stand on duration and the link to other

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disarmament measures probably reflects the concern of the Soviet leadership over the possibility of a stalemate on the sole issue of Soviet insistence on veto rights in the control commission. [Redacted]

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
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Middle East Drought

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[Widespread drought for the second consecutive year threatens to bring disaster to Jordanian agriculture. Winter-wheat crops have been seriously affected, and Jordan's crop potential, for 1958-59, even if rain falls now, is estimated at 80,000 tons in contrast with 242,000 tons produced during the last normal crop year of 1955-56. Further aggravating the situation is the lack of fodder for herds, which are decreasing below basic breeding levels. Export blockades of livestock to Jordan by Syria and Iraq have resulted in a perennial meat shortage. The Jordanian prime minister has requested the United States to provide "not less than 50,000 tons" of wheat in the near future--10,000 tons immediately. An additional request has been made for 40,000 tons of livestock feed. Assistance to finance work relief which would provide 50,000 jobs is also desired.]

[Israel, where the situation is somewhat less serious, has had almost no rain since last February, and crops sown in the southern part of the country must be considered lost, according to the Ministry of Agriculture. Unless the situation radically changes within the next few weeks, crops will be smaller than last year's poor production. The water table has been so lowered by the protracted dryness that there will be insufficient water for irrigation. Israel has requested wheat shipments.]

[Large swarms of locusts in Israel, as well as Jordan, are an additional menace to agricultural production. However, it appears that crop losses from this source have been moderate.]

[An estimated 90 percent of the population of Yemen is said to be faced with severe famine or starvation as the result of drought which has cut crop production to one third of normal. A Yemeni Government representative in Aden has stated that 20,000 tons of wheat will be needed within the next four months.]

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Situation in Morocco

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[Available evidence does not appear to justify Moroccan Government claims publicized on 7 and 8 January that dissident Berber tribesmen in northern Morocco are responding in large numbers to King Mohamed V's 5 January ultimatum ordering them to submit to government authority and return to their homes within 48 hours. Their virtual rebellion is still directed primarily against the Arab/urban-dominated Istiqlal party, which has been the principal force behind Moroccan governments since the country regained its independence two years ago. However, they are unlikely to accede to the King's directive unless they receive firmer assurances than they have apparently been offered thus far that at least some of their principal demands will be satisfied. These include the installation of local inhabitants in local government posts, more adequate representation in the central government, greater local autonomy, and measures to relieve the area's depressed economic conditions.]

[Royal Army elements in northern Morocco continue to be reinforced and redeployed, but they have apparently not yet attempted to force the re-establishment of contact by land with the garrison at the Mediterranean port city of Alhucemas-- reported encircled by armed Berber partisans as of 7 January--nor to move against the dissidents' Middle Atlas stronghold near Fez. A clash on 6 January between army forces based at Alhucemas and the dissidents, which reportedly resulted in over 100 casualties, may have reinforced the King's reluctance to order an all-out drive by the army despite his recent implicit threat to take such action. American representatives in Rabat reported on 7 January that the troop movements in progress as of that time appeared designed primarily to secure control of the main lines of communication in the affected regions and to isolate the Middle Atlas from the Rif-- not to penetrate difficult mountain terrain where the defiant Berber elements are ensconced. The American Army attaché continues to believe that the Royal Army is almost certain to be decimated by desertions if ordered to suppress the dissidents and could not in any case cope with a general Berber uprising.]

[Meanwhile, the attaché reports that other Berber tribes residing in the traditionally turbulent High Atlas region]

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south and east of Marrakech, in southern Morocco, are also
becoming increasingly restive] [redacted]

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Developing Philippine Nationalism

[Ambassador Bohlen notes increasing sentiment among Philippine officials for a modification of present Philippine foreign policy in the direction of less dependence on the United States. Filipinos have criticized the level of American military and economic aid in the light of what they regard as their "special relationship" with the United States. Growing nationalist feeling has also been evidenced by a hardened Philippine attitude in talks concerning American bases. Foreign Affairs Secretary Serrano recently declared that a "redefinition of the Philippine-American mutual defense concept" would be an immediate Philippine policy target in 1959. In part this trend stems from frustration over an unsatisfactory domestic political and economic situation.]

[Recently heightened interest in developing closer economic and political ties with neighboring Asian countries appears to be a manifestation of this growing nationalist sentiment. The goal of greater regional cooperation was heavily emphasized in the joint communiqué issued on 6 January by President Garcia and visiting Malayan Prime Minister Rahman. Within the framework of a strongly anti-Communist approach, Garcia discussed the same theme in a major foreign policy address in December, and he is said to be looking particularly to closer economic cooperation with Japan.]

[The increased momentum toward a "Filipino First" outlook is not at this stage indicative of a desire for a major policy shift, but it may foreshadow further strains in Philippine-American relations.]

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III. THE WEST

The New French Cabinet

Premier Michel Debré's cabinet reflects the strong rightist-nationalist orientation of the new National Assembly. It includes most of the leading personalities of the Soustelle-sparked Union for a New Republic (UNR), which won the largest bloc of deputies in the October elections. Most of the members are holdovers from the government formed by De Gaulle last June.

The key posts of foreign affairs and defense went to non-political "technicians," an arrangement which permits De Gaulle to exercise close control over those areas in which the new constitution and recent decrees give him special powers. The Ministry of the Interior, which had been sought by Soustelle, also was placed in the hands of a technician. Attachment of Soustelle to the office of the premier, however, may somewhat mollify his integrationist supporters among the European settlers in Algeria, who hoped he would be premier.

Though the Socialists are absent, intending to go into "constructive opposition," the rightist weight of Debré and the UNR will be tempered both by the presence of the Popular Republicans and by De Gaulle himself, who has already laid down the guidelines of French domestic and external policy and who is expected to play an active role in his new position as President. Furthermore, at least 50 UNR deputies can be considered leftist in their social and economic views.

The combination of Debré as premier and De Gaulle as President should provide France with an effective executive team. The two men hold similar views on most questions. De Gaulle may occasionally use the outspoken Debré to set up extreme positions for bargaining purposes. The most immediately urgent problem facing the government will be the implementation of the austerity program announced on 28 December. The program initially aroused hostility in working-class and trade-union circles, and the discontent has spread to Finance Minister Pinay's Independent party as well.

Debré, a 47-year-old lawyer, won prominence by his strong nationalist stand in the Council of the Republic, where he was a leading Gaullist spokesman from 1948 until De Gaulle appointed

him minister of justice last June. He has firm ideas about asserting the authority of the executive vis-a-vis Parliament, a view reflected in the new constitution, which is largely his handiwork.

Debr 's excessive nationalism has been frequently apparent in the critical attitude he has taken on American policies which he considers inimical to France's international prestige. He is similarly outspoken in his opposition to submerging French sovereignty in European integration projects and is insistent on holding Algeria at all costs, rejecting the federal-type solution De Gaulle is presumed to consider acceptable. His sincere attachment to De Gaulle is expected to limit any early overt friction between them. Nevertheless, his strong personality and stubborn attitudes on controversial international issues may eventually lead to policy differences with De Gaulle.

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The Situation in Cuba

The arrival of Fidel Castro in Havana on 8 January, after his triumphal progress from Oriente Province, will assist the regime of Provisional President Urrutia in its efforts to form a workable government. Numerous decisions on governmental policy, on military reorganization, and on relations among competing rebel groups had awaited his arrival. [Meanwhile, there are some signs of feeling against the US Government among members of the new regime and a general desire to speed the "Cubanization" of foreign-owned industries, particularly sugar plantations. At present, about 50 percent of total sugar investment in Cuba is US capital. The percentage has been declining for some years.]

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The US Army attaché found Camp Colombia, Cuba's chief military base near Havana, completely disorganized on 7 January. The army is undergoing a thorough purge of all officers guilty of "crimes" under Batista, and at least 15 are reported already to have been executed. Even the capable Colonel Barquin and other professional officers associated with him in the 1956 attempt to oust Batista have apparently been retired. Officers of the 26 of July Movement in Havana told the attaché that the highest army rank will be major and that present officers of higher rank permitted to remain in service will have to accept demotions. Many rebel soldiers are expected to be integrated into the armed forces. These drastic measures may well, in the long run, create a core of embittered former career officers dangerous to the regime.

Fidel Castro, who is slated to head the armed forces, is quoted as belittling the value of the US Military Mission to the Cuban Army under Batista and claiming that it is no longer needed. He has also indicated, however, that the government will not establish diplomatic relations with Sino-Soviet bloc governments, or any other dictatorships.

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Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

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Special Adviser to the President

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The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

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